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Abstract
We consider an assignment market with one seller who owns several indivisible
heterogeneous goods and many buyers each willing to buy up to a given capacity.
In this market, the core contains the Vickrey payoff vector. Notwithstanding,
core allocations may not be supported by competitive equilibrium prices, even in
a finite replication of the market. We first characterize convexity of the associ-
ated coalitional game and we show that it is a sufficient condition so that the
buyers-optimal core allocation is competitive. With respect to the seller-optimal
core allocation, we provide a characterization of competitiveness by means of buy-
ers’ valuations. In addition, we characterize in terms of the valuation matrix the
coincidence between the core and the set of competitive equilibrium payoff vectors.
JEL classification: C71, C78
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1 Introduction
We study markets with several buyers and only one seller. The seller owns many indi-
visible and potentially different objects on sale. Being heterogeneous, the objects are
of the same type, for instance different houses or different tasks. On the other side of
the market, each buyer has a non-negative valuation for each object and a desire to
acquire a certain number of objects. This number is known as the capacity of the buyer.
Since we are thinking of objects such as houses, cars or jobs, it makes sense to assume
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that a buyer, even if he values all of them positively, is not interested in acquiring more
units than those that can be of use to him. We assume buyers have quasi-linear utility
functions and value packages of objects additively up to a given capacity. Side-payments
are allowed. Our aim is to determine under which conditions all core allocations can be
priced by means of competitive prices.
This market is a particular case of the one considered in Jaume et al. (2012) and
Massó and Neme (2014), where there are several sellers, each with a set of heterogeneous
objects on sale. It also a particular case of the package auction of Ausubel and Milgrom
(2002), where there is only one seller, but buyers may not value packages additively.
Two-sided markets with one seller have also been considered in Camiña (2006) and
Stuart (2007). Two-sided markets with transferable utility are first considered from
the viewpoint of coalitional games in the assignment game (Shapley and Shubik, 1972).
In this market, buyers want to buy at most one unit and the objects on sale belong
to different sellers. The core is non-empty and coincides with the set of competitive
equilibrium payoff vectors (Gale, 1960). It has a lattice structure with two particular
core elements, one of them optimal for all buyers and the other one optimal for all sellers.
When the assumptions of the classical assignment model are relaxed, the lattice
structure of the core and its coincidence with the set of competitive equilibrium payoff
vectors do not hold in general. This is the case of many-to-many assignment markets
where both buyers and sellers may be willing to trade more than one object and buyers
value packages of objects additively up to their given capacity. The core of this game is
always non-empty but has no lattice structure and it remains an open problem whether
in this setting an optimal core element for each side of the market does exist. However,
even under the assumptions that each seller has a set of homogeneous objects on sale,
Sotomayor (2002) shows that a worst core element for each side of the market may not
exist.
In the more encompassing many-to-many assignment model where each seller has
several units of potentially different objects, the set of competitive equilibrium payoff
vectors is non-empty and is strictly included in the core. However, let us point out that
the definition of competitive equilibrium in Jaume et al. (2012) and Massó and Neme
(2014) assumes that buyers demand as many copies of their preferred object as their
capacities allow, being the prices given. Instead, we will follow the notion of competitive
equilibrium used for more general markets in Gul and Stacchetti (1999), and also in
Sotomayor (2007) and Arribillaga et al. (2014) for many-to-many assignment markets.
There, competitive equilibrium is defined by means of a demand correspondence in
which buyers maximize the utility of the packages they can buy given prices and their
capacities. As a consequence, when buyers in a many-to-many assignment market value
packages of objects additively, it may be the case that in a demanded package a buyer
may obtain different utilities from the different objects that form the package.
In the present paper, where we have only one seller with heterogeneous goods and
multi-unit demands, we study the relationship between the core and the set of compet-
itive equilibria. We say that a core allocation is competitive if it is the payoff vector
associated to some competitive equilibrium. Then, this core allocation is said to be
supported by that vector of competitive equilibrium prices.
We first notice that the valuation functions of buyers in our model are monotone
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and satisfy the gross-substitute property. This implies that the characteristic function
of the game is buyers-submodular (Gul and Stacchetti, 1999) and then, as an immediate
consequence of Ausubel and Milgrom (2002), the core has a very simple structure: it
is the non-empty set of efficient payoff vectors where each buyer gets a non-negative
payoff bounded by his marginal contribution to the whole market. Hence, the core is
endowed with a lattice structure by the partial order defined from the point of view of
buyers and there exists one optimal core element for each side of the market. Moreover,
as in the assignment game, in the buyers-optimal core allocation each buyer is paid his
marginal contribution, that is, the Vickrey payoff (Vickrey, 1961). Our first aim is to
analize under which conditions the two optimal core allocations are competitive.
Also for valuations that are monotone and satisfy the gross-substitute property, Gul
and Stacchetti (1999) characterizes the maximum and minimum competitive prices and
show that even if the Vickrey outcome is not supported by the minimum competitive
price vector, it will become a competitive allocation of the enlarged market obtained by
a finite replication of the original market. Compared to that, we look for sufficient con-
ditions on the market valuations that guarantee that the buyers-optimal core allocation
(the Vickrey outcome) is competitive.
In the literature, the relationship between the whole core and the set of competitive
equilibria has been addressed. In particular Massó and Neme (2014) shows that for
many-to-many assignment markets the core converges to the set of competitive equilibria
payoff vectors in an infinite replication of the market. Although with a slightly different
definition of competitive equilibria, they also show that this coincidence may not be
attained with a finite replication. Also in our setting, we show that the core of the
one-seller assignment game may not coincide with the set of competitive equilibrium
payoff vector when the original market is replicated finitely many times. In particular,
different to Gul and Stacchetti (1999) results for the Vickrey outcome, we show that
the seller-optimal core allocation may not be competitive in any finite replication of the
one-seller assignment market.
Further, we give necessary and sufficient conditions on the buyers’ valuations so
that the seller-optimal core allocation is supported by the maximum competitive prices.
Finally, we also characterize those buyers’ valuations under which the set of competitive
equilibrium payoff vectors coincides with the core.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section, the model is introduced
and the necessary preliminaries are addressed. Section 3 is devoted to study under
which conditions the buyers-optimal and the seller-optimal core allocations come from a
competitive equilibrium. Finally, in Section 4 we characterize the coincidence between
the set of competitive equilibrium payoff vectors and the core.
2 The model and some preliminaries
The one-seller assignment market with multi-unit demands is defined by a 5-tuple
(M, {0}, Q,A, r). The finite set of m buyers is denoted by M and the unique seller
is denoted by 0. The seller owns a finite set Q of objects. These objects are indivisible
and heterogeneous, but of a similar type, let us say different houses or different (maybe
part-time) jobs.
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Each buyer-object pair (i, j) ∈M ×Q has a potential gain aij ∈ R+, interpreted as
the valuation of object j by buyer i, where R+ stands for the set of non-negative real
numbers. Given a set S, we will denote by |S| the cardinality of S and 2S the set of
all subsets of S. Without loss of generality, we normalize to zero the reservation value
the seller has for each object. The valuation matrix, denoted by A = (aij)(i,j)∈M×Q,
captures each potential gain of all buyer-object pairs. Moreover, each buyer i ∈M can
acquire ri ∈ N objects and the vector r = (ri)i∈M ∈ NM indicates the buyers’ capacities.
We assume that the seller owns some copies of a dummy object, as many as the sum of
all buyers’ capacities,
∑
i∈M ri. With some abuse of notation, each copy of this dummy
object is denoted by j0 and each buyer values it at zero.
We assume that the utility of each buyer is quasi-linear in money and that buyers
value packages of objects additively up to their given capacity. That is, buyer i ∈ M









A matching µ between S ⊆ M and Q in the market (M, {0}, Q,A, r), is a subset
of S × Q such that each j ∈ Q belongs to at most one pair and each i ∈ S belongs to
exactly ri pairs. Notice that it is possible to match any buyer with dummy objects to
complete his capacity. We denote by M(S,Q) the set of matchings between S ⊆ M
and Q, µ(S) is the set of objects matched by µ to some buyer in S, and when S = {i}
we simply write µ(i). We denote by µ−1(j) the buyer matched to object j ∈ Q by µ.
Let (M, {0}, Q,A, r) be a market. Given S ⊆M , a matching µ ∈M(S,Q) is optimal





aij for all µ
′ ∈M(S,Q).
We denote byMA(S,Q) the set of optimal matchings between S and Q in this market.
Let us introduce the definition of a coalitional game with transferable utility (a
game). A game (N, v) is a pair formed by a finite set of players N and a characteristic
function v that assigns a real number v(S) to each coalition S ⊆ N , with v(∅) = 0. The









xi ≥ v(S) for all S ⊆ N
}
.
Now, we consider a game associated to one-seller assignment markets. For any
(M, {0}, Q,A, r), the one-seller assignment game related to (M, {0}, Q,A, r) is denoted
by (M ∪ {0}, vA). The worth of any coalition formed by only one type of agents is zero,
because in these cases there is no trade. When a coalition is formed by a group of buyers
S ⊆M and the seller, the worth is given by the following expression







Now, we define competitive equilibrium for a one-seller assignment market with
multi-unit demands (M, {0}, Q,A, r). We define by 2Qri = {R ⊆ Q; |R| = ri} the set
of allowable packages of objects for a buyer i ∈ M . A price vector p = (pj)j∈Q ∈ RQ+
consists of one price for each object, with a price of zero for each dummy object. For







(aij − pj) ≥
∑
j∈R′
(aij − pj) for all R′ ∈ 2Qri
}
.
The demand set of any buyer is never empty but, at sufficiently high prices, the
demand set can be formed only by dummy objects.
Definition 2.1. A competitive equilibrium for a one-seller assignment market (M, {0}, Q,A, r)
is a pair (p, µ) ∈ RQ+ ×M(M,Q), such that the following two conditions hold:
C.1 For all i ∈M , µ(i) ∈ Di(p),
C.2 For all j ∈ Q \ µ(M), pj = 0.
If a pair (p, µ) is a competitive equilibrium, we say that p is a competitive equilibrium
price vector. The payoff vector associated to (p, µ) is (U(p, µ), V (p, µ)) ∈ RM×R, where
Ui(p, µ) =
∑
j∈µ(i) (aij − pj) for each i ∈M, and
V (p, µ) =
∑
j∈Q pj for the seller.
(1)
Gul and Stacchetti (1999) shows that when all buyers value packages additively
up to a given capacity, these valuations satisfy the gross-substitutes condition1 as well
as monotonicity.2 Then, the following consequences regarding the set of competitive
equilibria follow easily for one-seller assignment markets with multi-unit demands.
R.1 If (p, µ) is a competitive equilibrium, then µ is optimal and, for any optimal
matching µ′, (p, µ′) is also a competitive equilibrium.
R.2 The set of competitive equilibrium price vectors of the market is non-empty and
forms a complete lattice.











In order to express the minimum competitive price of an object k ∈ Q in a market
(M, {0}, Q,A, r), we need to consider a new type of matchings. We will allow only
object k to be matched at most twice but not to the same buyer. This is equivalent to
1The gross-substitutes condition was introduced by Kelso and Crawford (1982) and it requires that
for any two price vectors p and q such that q > p, and any R ∈ Di(p), there exists R′ ∈ Di(q) such
that {j ∈ R|pj = qj} ⊆ R′.
2Monotonicity simply says that if R′ ⊆ R then the valuation of package R′ is at least as high as the
valuation of R.
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introducing an identical copy of object k and restrict to matchings that do not assign the
two copies to the same buyer. With some abuse of notation, we will denote this set of
matchings byMk(M,Q). Now, we can give an expression for the minimum competitive
equilibrium prices.














Result R.1 and the existence of competitive equilibria can also be found in Arribillaga
et al. (2014) for a more general assignment model.
In the definitions of competitive equilibria, the owners of the objects do no play
any role. Hence the set of competitive equilibria of the one-seller assignment market
(M, {0}, Q,A, r) equals the set of competitive equilibria of the related many-to-one
market where each object belongs to a different seller. Moreover, these competitive prices
are easily described by linear equalities and inequalities. A pair (p, µ) ∈ RQ+×M(M,Q)
is a competitive equilibrium of (M, {0}, Q,A, r) if and only if
0 ≤ pj ≤ aij for all (i, j) ∈ µ, pj = 0 for all j ∈ Q \ µ(M) and
aij − pj ≥ aik − pk for each i ∈M, all j ∈ µ(i) and all k ∈ Q \ {µ(i)}. (4)
To better analyze the relationship between the core and the competitive equilibria for
the one-seller assignment game, we first find a simple description of the core of the
game. To this end, we use a result in Ausubel and Milgrom (2002). They introduce
the notion of buyers-submodularity, which means that the marginal contribution of a
buyer to a coalition containing the seller decreases as the coalition grows larger. A game
(M ∪ {0}, v) is buyers-submodular if for all i ∈M ,
v((T ∪ {i}) ∪ {0})− v(T ∪ {0}) ≥ v((S ∪ {i}) ∪ {0})− v(S ∪ {0}), (5)
for all T ⊆ S ⊆M \{i}. The following result shows that the one-seller assignment game
is buyers-submodular.
Proposition 2.2. Let (M, {0}, Q,A, r) be a one-seller assignment market and (M ∪
{0}, vA) be its related one-seller assignment game. Then (M ∪ {0}, vA) is buyers-
submodular.
Proof. Recall that buyers’ valuations satisfy the gross-substitutes condition and mono-
tonicity (Gul and Stacchetti, 1999). Therefore, by Theorem 11 in Ausubel and Milgrom
(2002), the game (M ∪ {0}, vA) is buyers-submodular.
Together with the fact that coalitions not containing the seller have null worth,
buyers-submodularity implies that the one-seller assignment game (M ∪ {0}, vA) is a
big-boss game, as defined in Muto et al. (1988).3 As a consequence of Theorem 7 in
3Buyers submodularity clearly implies condition B2** in page 312 of Muto et al. (1988), which
implies B2 in the definition of big-boss game.
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Ausubel and Milgrom (2002), or also Theorem 3.2 in Muto et al. (1988), the core of the
one-seller assignment game is non-empty and can be described by{
(U, V ) ∈ RM × R
∣∣∣∣∣ ∑
i∈M
Ui + V = vA(M ∪ {0}), 0 ≤ Ui ≤M vAi for all i ∈M
}
, (6)
where M vAi = vA(M ∪ {0}) − vA((M \ {i}) ∪ {0}) denotes the marginal contribution
of buyer i ∈ M to the grand coalition, which is also known as the Vickrey payoff for
this agent. Furthermore, the core is a lattice with respect to the usual order defined
on buyers’ payoffs. Then, we can guarantee the existence of one optimal core allocation
for each side of the market. In the buyers-optimal core allocation (U, V ) ∈ RM × R,
each buyer gets his marginal contribution, that is, U i = M
vA
i for all i ∈ M and V =




i . On the other hand, in the seller-optimal core allocation
(U, V ) ∈ RM × R, each buyer i ∈ M gets U i = 0 and V = vA(M ∪ {0}). Thus, the
core of the one-seller assignment game has an optimal core allocation for each market
sector as it happens in the classical Shapley and Shubik (1972) assignment game. This
is not known to be true for other many-to-many assignment models (see e.g. Sotomayor,
2002).
A first relationship between core and competitive equilibrium for many-to-many as-
signment markets is well known (see for instance Theorem 36 in Arribillaga et al., 2014):
the payoff vector (U(p, µ), V (p, µ)) associated to any competitive equilibrium (p, µ) of
the one-seller market (M, {0}, Q,A, r) (or of any many-to-many assignment market)
belongs to the core of the associated game. However, there may be core allocations
not supported by competitive equilibrium prices. In particular, we ask when the two
optimal core allocations are competitive payoff vectors.
3 When optimal core allocations are competitive?
To begin the study of the relationship between optimal core allocations and the com-
petitive equilibria, we focus on conditions on the buyers’ valuations so that optimal core
allocations are supported by competitive equilibria.
As it was remarked in the previous section, the set of competitive equilibrium payoff
vectors is a subset of the core. Notwithstanding, the one-seller assignment market has
an interesting property which does not hold in more general many-to-many assignment
markets: the Vickrey outcome coincides with the buyers-optimal core allocation. The
relationship between the Vickrey outcome and the set of competitive equilibria was
addressed in Gul and Stacchetti (1999). They show that when the original market
is replicated finitely many times, the Vickrey outcome is supported by a competitive
equilibrium in the enlarged market. In fact, they show that it is sufficient to replicate
the market at least as many times as the number of objects. In spite of that, we are
interested in conditions to guarantee competitive optimal core allocations in the original
market, with no need of replication.
The next proposition concerns the buyers-optimal core allocation and characterizes
those markets in which it is possible to allocate to each buyer (one of) his most preferred
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package of objects. The feasibility of such an allocation characterizes the convexity of
the game4 and implies the existence of a competitive buyers-optimal core allocation.
Proposition 3.1. Let (M, {0}, Q,A, r) be a one-seller assignment market and (M ∪
{0}, vA) its related one-seller assignment game. The following assertions are equivalent:
i. (M ∪ {0}, vA) is convex,





aij for all R ∈ 2Qri . (8)
iii. The minimum competitive equilibrium price vector is p = (0, ..., 0) ∈ RQ+.
Proof. i.⇒ ii. First, it can be deduced from Proposition 3.4 in Muto et al. (1988) that
(M ∪ {0}, vA) is convex if and only if for any S ⊆M ,




Now, assume that (M ∪ {0}, vA) is convex. We have that for all µ ∈MA(M,Q),∑
(i,j)∈µ











i for all i ∈M , expression (9) implies that
∑
j∈µ(i) aij = M
vA
i for





aij for all R ∈ 2Qri .
Since (M ∪ {0}, vA) is convex, then∑
j∈Ri
aij = vA({i, 0}) = M vAi for all i ∈M,







all R ∈ 2Qri .
ii. ⇒ iii. Take the matching µ of statement ii. and the price vector p = (0, ..., 0) ∈
RQ+. It is immediate that by (8), µ(i) ∈ Di(p) for each i ∈ N . Indeed, (p, µ) is a
competitive equilibrium. The minimality of the price vector p is also immediate.
4A game (N, v) is convex if for all S, T ⊆ N
v(S) + v(T ) ≤ v(S ∪ T ) + v(S ∩ T ). (7)
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iii. ⇒ i. Since p = (0, ..., 0) ∈ RQ+ is a competitive equilibrium price vector, then
there is a matching µ ∈M(M,Q) such that µ(i) ∈ Di(p) for all i ∈ N . In fact, because




aij = vA(S ∪ {0}) for all S ⊆M.
As a consequence, it is easy to see that M vAi =
∑
j∈µ(i) aij for every i ∈ M . Then, we







aij = vA(S ∪ {0}),
which shows that the game (M ∪ {0}, vA) is convex.
Notice that if the above equivalent conditions hold, and µ is a matching that allocates
to each buyer one of his preferred packages, then the Vickrey payoff of each i ∈ M is∑
j∈µ(i) aij and hence it is attained at the minimum competitive equilibrium. However,
there are instances (see Example 3.2) in which the game is not convex but the buyers-
optimal core allocation is also competitive. To see that, we only need to check whether
for all i ∈ M it holds M vAi =
∑
j∈µ(i)(aij − pj), where µ is an optimal matching and
p ∈ RQ+ can be computed following expression (2).
The next example also shows that the fact that the buyers-optimal core allocation is
supported by competitive prices does not guarantee that all other core allocations are
also competitive.
Example 3.2. Consider a market with unitary capacities (M, {0}, Q,A, r) given by
M = {1, 2}, Q = {1′, 2′} and r = (1, 1). For the purposes of this example, we show no






Consider the one-seller assignment game (M∪{0}, vA). By (6), the core can be described
by the set of payoff vectors (U, V ) ∈ R2+ × R+ such that U1 + U2 + V = 8, U1 ≤ 4 and
U2 ≤ 3.
Take the unique optimal matching µ = {(1, 2′), (2, 1′)}. By (4), a price p ∈ R2+ is a
competitive price vector if and only if 0 ≤ p1′ ≤ 4, 0 ≤ p2′ ≤ 4 and 1 ≤ p1′ − p2′ ≤ 2.
Since the corresponding payoff vector (U1, U2;V ) satisfies U1 = 4− p2′, U2 = 4− p1′ and
V = p1′ + p2′, we have p1′ − p2′ = (4−U2)− (4−U1) = U1−U2. Hence, the competitive
equilibrium payoff vectors are described by U1+U2+V = 8, 1 ≤ U1−U2 ≤ 2, 0 ≤ U1 ≤ 4
and 0 ≤ U2 ≤ 4. Figure 1 depicts the core and the set of competitive equilibrium payoff
vectors.
In the above example the game is not convex and the buyers-optimal core allocation
is supported by a competitive equilibrium while the seller-optimal core allocation is
not. Moreover, although convexity is a strong condition, it is not sufficient to guarantee













Figure 1: The set of competitive equilibria payoff vectors CE(A) is strictly included in
the core C(vA)
Example 3.3. Consider a market (M, {0}, Q,A, r) given by M = {1, 2}, Q = {1′, 2′, 3′}
and r = (1, 1). The valuation matrix A is the following
( 1′ 2′ 3′
1 2 4 1
2 2 1 1
)
.
Note that the game is convex and the seller-optimal core allocation is (U, V ) = (0, 0; 6).
We can obtain the maximum competitive equilibrium prices p = (1, 3, 0) by means of
formula (3) and we see that the corresponding payoff vector is (U, V ) = (1, 1; 4) which
is not the seller-optimal core allocation.
An interesting fact about the seller-optimal core allocation is the following. When
the seller-optimal core allocation is not a competitive equilibrium payoff vector, even
if the economy is replicated finitely many times as in Gul and Stacchetti (1999), it
may not be supported by any competitive equilibrium in the enlarged market. To see
this, consider the previous example. If we replicate the market finitely many times, the
replicas of object 3′ will be unmatched in any optimal matching. As a consequence, the
price of these replicas in any competitive equilibrium will be zero. Assume there is a
competitive equilibrium that supports the seller-optimal core allocation in the enlarged
market. In this equilibrium each buyer will pay for each of his matched objects his own
valuation of the object. But then, any buyer strictly prefers a replica of object 3′ for
free to his matched objects at the described prices, and this contradicts these prices are
competitive.
In order to characterize when the seller-optimal core allocation is competitive, let us
first define the set of desirable objects, Q∗A. We say that an object is desirable if at least
one buyer valuates it positively
Q∗A = {j ∈ Q | aij > 0 for some i ∈M}.
The following result gives a characterization of markets so that the seller-optimal core
allocation is competitive.
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Proposition 3.4. Let (M, {0}, Q,A, r) be a one-seller assignment market. The seller-
optimal core allocation is a competitive equilibrium payoff vector if and only if there is
an optimal matching µ ∈MA(M,Q) and the following two conditions are satisfied:
(a) For each j ∈ µ(M), aij ≤ aµ−1(j)j for all i ∈M \ {µ−1(j)},
(b) Q∗A ⊆ µ(M).
Proof. We first prove the ‘if’ part. Assume that µ ∈MA(M,Q) satisfies conditions (a)
and (b). Define pj = aµ−1(j)j for all j ∈ µ(M) and pj = 0 for all j ∈ Q \µ(M). We show
that µ(i) ∈ Di(p) for all i ∈ M . Take any i ∈ M and consider any R ∈ 2Qri . Since µ
satisfies (a) and (b), and by definition of p, we have∑
j∈R
(aij − pj) =
∑
j∈R∩µ(M)
(aij − aµ−1(j)j) +
∑
j∈R\µ(M)




and thus µ(i) ∈ Di(p) for all i ∈ M . Besides, by definition of p, we get pj = 0 for each
j ∈ Q \ µ(M). Notice that (U(p, µ), V (p, µ)) is the seller-optimal core allocation.
Now, we prove the ‘only if’ part. Assume that (p, µ) is a competitive equilibrium
and (U(p, µ), V (p, µ)) is the seller-optimal core allocation. By property R.1 in page 5,
we have that µ ∈MA(M,Q). Moreover, in the seller-optimal core allocation the seller’s
payoff is equal to vA(M ∪ {0}).
We claim that
pj = aµ−1(j)j for all j ∈ µ(M). (10)
If pj > aµ−1(j)j for some j ∈ µ(M), then for all R ∈ Dµ−1(j)(p) we have j /∈ R, and as a
consequence (p, µ) is not a competitive equilibrium. On the other hand, if pj < aµ−1(j)j
for some j ∈ µ(M) then
∑
j∈Q pj < vA(M ∪ {0}) and the seller-optimal core allocation
is not the payoff vector of (p, µ).
Now, taking (10) into account, we shall prove that µ satisfies condition (a) of the
statement. Assume on the contrary that there is some i ∈ M such that aij > aµ−1(j)j
for some j ∈ Q with i ∈ M \ {µ−1(j)}. Let R ∈ 2Qri be the package formed by object j




j∈R(aij − pj) >
0 =
∑
j∈µ(i)(aij − pj), we obtain that µ(i) /∈ Di(p) in contradiction with (p, µ) being
a competitive equilibrium. Then µ satisfies (a). In order to show (b), assume on the
contrary that, there is some j ∈ Q∗A \ µ(M). By definition of competitive equilibrium,
the price of this object is pj = 0. Since j ∈ Q∗A, there is some i ∈ M such that
aij > 0. This implies that µ(i) /∈ Di(p) because
∑
j∈R(aij − pj) >
∑
j∈µ(i)(aij − pj)
where R = {j, j10 , j20 , ..., j
ri−1
0 }. This contradicts (p, µ) being a competitive equilibrium.
Hence, µ satisfies (b).
Condition (a) above requires that each object must be allocated to the buyer who
values it the most, while condition (b) simply says that each desirable object must be
allocated. Notice that condition (a) is not satisfied in Example 3.2, and condition (b) is
not satisfied in Example 3.3.
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4 Characterization of the coincidence of the core
and the competitive equilibria payoff vectors
In this section, we address the relationship between the whole core and the set of com-
petitive equilibria. The aim is to obtain conditions so that the core coincides with the
set of competitive equilibrium payoff vectors, that is, to obtain a competitive core. For
more general many-to-many assignment markets but with a different definition of the
demand set, Massó and Neme (2014) shows that the sequence of cores of replicated
markets converges to the set of competitive equilibrium payoffs when the number of
replicas tends to infinity. Moreover, for any number of replicas there is a market with
a core payoff that is not a competitive equilibrium payoff. Also, for our definition of
competitive equilibrium that follows Gul and Stacchetti (1999), Example 3.3 shows that
the process of finite replication does not guarantee a competitive seller-optimal core
allocation.
Since no core coincidence result can be achieved for arbitrary one-seller assignment
markets, after a finite replication of the economy, we focus on the search of conditions on
buyers’ valuations that guarantee that all core allocations are competitive. Taking into
account propositions 3.1 and 3.4, one might wonder if convexity together with conditions
(a) and (b) of Proposition 3.4 are sufficient to obtain a competitive core. The answer is
in the negative as the next example shows.
Example 4.1. Consider a market (M, {0}, Q,A, r) given by M = {1, 2}, Q = {1′, 2′}






Note that the game is convex and conditions (a) and (b) of Proposition 3.4 hold. Consider
the core allocation (4, 0; 2). Notice that the unique optimal matching in this market
assigns object 1′ to buyer 2 and object 2′ to buyer 1. Because of the unitary demands,
the unique price vector that supports the core allocation (4, 0; 2) is p = (2, 0). However,
p = (2, 0) is not a competitive equilibrium price vector since {1′} /∈ D2(p).
The following theorem is the main result of this paper and characterizes the coinci-
dence between the set of competitive equilibrium payoff vectors and the core.
Theorem 4.2. Let (M, {0}, Q,A, r) be a one-seller assignment market and (M∪{0}, vA)
be its associated one-seller assignment game. The core of (M∪{0}, vA) coincides with the
set of competitive equilibrium payoff vectors if and only if there is an optimal matching
µ ∈MA(M,Q) that satisfies the following three conditions:
(a) For each j ∈ µ(M), aij ≤ aµ−1(j)j for all i ∈M \ {µ−1(j)},
(b) Q∗A ⊆ µ(M),








for all i ∈M .
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Proof. We first prove the ‘if’ part. Assume that some µ ∈ MA(M,Q) satisfies (a),
(b) and (c). We show that any (U, V ) ∈ C(vA) is the payoff vector of some competitive
equilibrium. By conditions (a) and (c), for each i ∈M , we can find some (αij)j∈µ(i) ∈ Rri




(aij − αij). (11)
Take any (U, V ) ∈ C(vA) and define bi = M vAi − Ui for all i ∈ M . Since for all i ∈ M
we have M vAi ≥ Ui ≥ 0, then M
vA
i ≥ bi ≥ 0.









if j ∈ µ(M) and M vAµ−1(j) > 0,
if j ∈ µ(M) and M vAµ−1(j) = 0,
if j ∈ Q \ µ(M).
(12)
Notice that p ∈ RQ+. We show that µ(i) ∈ Di(p) for all i ∈ M . It is sufficient to
see that aij − pj ≥ aik − pk for all j ∈ µ(i) and all k ∈ Q \ µ(i). To this end, let us
see that for all i ∈ M and all j ∈ µ(i) it holds aij − pj ≥ 0 while aik − pk ≤ 0 for
all k ∈ Q \ µ(i). On one hand, take i ∈ M such that M vAi > 0. Then aij − pj =





) ≥ 0 for all j ∈ µ(i). Take i ∈ M such
that M vAi = 0. Then aij − pj = aij − aij = 0 for all j ∈ µ(i). On the other hand,
take k ∈ µ(M) such that M vAµ−1(k) > 0. Then for any i ∈ M \ {µ
−1(k)}, we have





bµ−1(k) ≤ 0 because aµ−1(k)k ≥ αµ−1(k)k ≥ aik.
Take k ∈ µ(M) such that M vAµ−1(k) = 0. Then for any i ∈ M \ {µ
−1(k)}, we have
aik− pk = aik− aµ−1(k)k ≤ 0 because of assumption (a). Finally, consider k ∈ Q \µ(M).
Then for any i ∈ M , aik − pk = 0 because of (b). Thus µ(i) ∈ Di(p) for all i ∈ M and






















= M vAi − bi = Ui,
for all i ∈ M such that M vAi > 0, where the last equality comes from expression (11).
Take now any i ∈ M such that M vAi = 0. From the definition of pj in (12), we have
Ui(p, µ) =
∑
j∈µ(i)(aij − pj) =
∑
j∈µ(i)(aij − aij) = 0 = Ui. Since (U(p, µ), V (p, µ)) ∈
C(vA) for any competitive equilibrium (p, µ), by efficiency the seller’s payoff is V (p, µ) =
vA(M ∪{0})−
∑
i∈M Ui(p, µ) = vA(M ∪{0})−
∑
i∈M Ui = V . This completes the proof
of the ‘if’ part.
Now, we prove the ‘only if’ part. Assume that the core and the set of payoff vec-
tors associated with the competitive equilibria coincide. By Proposition 3.4, conditions
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(a) and (b) hold for some optimal matching µ ∈ MA(M,Q). Then, we only have to
prove (c). Assume on the contrary that for this µ, there is some buyer i′ ∈ M such
that M vAi′ >
∑
j∈µ(i′)(ai′j − maxt∈M\{i′}{atj}). Recall the description of the core in
(6) and consider (U, V ) ∈ C(vA) with Ui′ = M vAi′ for the buyer i′ and Ui = 0 for all
i ∈M \ {i′}. By assumption, there is a competitive equilibrium (p, µ′) such that (U, V )
is its payoff vector. Take this competitive equilibrium price vector p and the matching
µ ∈MA(M,Q) such that M vAi′ >
∑
j∈µ(i′)(ai′j−maxt∈M\{i′}{atj}). Then (p, µ) is a com-
petitive equilibrium (recall R.1 in page 5). Therefore pj = aµ−1(j)j for all j ∈ µ(M \{i′})
and M vAi′ =
∑
j∈µ(i′)(ai′j − pj). We obtain
∑









j∈µ(i′) pj which im-
plies that there is some i ∈M \ {i′} such that aij > pj for some j ∈ µ(i′). We have that
µ(i) /∈ Di(p) because aik−pk = 0 < aij−pj for all k ∈ µ(i) and the above j /∈ µ(i). This
contradicts that (p, µ) is a competitive equilibrium. Hence, condition (c) holds.
The above theorem gives a characterization of the competitive core in one-seller
assignment markets. Notice that the core and competitive equilibrium payoff vectors do
not coincide in Example 4.1 because (c) is not satisfied.
As a consequence of Theorem 4.2, when the buyers have a sufficiently large capacity,
the core coincides with the set of competitive equilibrium payoff vectors. Indeed, when
there are no capacity constraints (or each buyer has a capacity greater than the number
of non-dummy objects), an optimal matching assigns each object to one of the buyers
who values it the most. Hence, conditions (a) and (b) are satisfied. Moreover, when a
buyer leaves the market, his objects are assigned to the buyers with the second highest
valuation, and this implies that for all i ∈M , condition (c) holds with an equality.
It is also quite straightforward to check that if for some capacities r ∈ NM the core
of the market (M, {0}, Q,A, r) coincides with the set of competitive equilibrium payoff
vectors, then they also coincide if capacities are increased to r′ where r′i ≥ ri for all
i ∈M .
Finally, the following corollary allows us to obtain a stronger condition for the coin-
cidence of the core and the set of competitive equilibrium payoff vectors.
Corollary 4.3. Let (M, {0}, Q,A, r) be a one-seller assignment market and µ ∈MA(M,Q)
be such that: (∗) if (i, j) /∈ µ then aij = 0. The core coincides with the set of competitive
equilibrium payoff vectors.
Proof. It is immediate to see that (∗) implies conditions (a) and (b) of Theorem 4.2.










atj ≥ vA(M ∪ {0})− vA((M \ {i}) ∪ {0}) = M vAi .
(13)
Since (∗) holds, expression (13) implies condition (c) of Theorem 4.2. Therefore, (∗)
implies the coincidence between the core and the set of competitive equilibria.
Note that property (∗) is stronger than convexity of the game and it represents
those markets where agents only value positively objects optimally assigned to them.
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The next example shows that if a buyer places a small positive valuation on some object
not assigned to him, the coincidence between core and competitive equilibrium payoff
vectors may be lost.
Example 4.4. Consider a market (M, {0}, Q,A, r) given by M = {1, 2}, Q = {1′, 2′},






Since the marginal contributions of the two buyers are 4 and 2 respectively, (0, 2; 4)
belongs to the core. This core element can only be supported by prices p = (0, 4) but at the
price of 0, buyer 1 would prefer object 1 rather than object 2. Hence, for any 0 < ε < 4,
the core of this market does not coincide with the set of competitive equilibrium payoff
vectors.
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Jaume, D., J. Massó, and A. Neme (2012), “The multiple-partners assignment game with
heterogeneous sales and multi-unit demands: competitive equilibria.” Mathematical
Methods of Operations Research, 76, 161–187.
Kelso, A. and V. Crawford (1982), “Job matching, coalition formation and gross sub-
stitutes.” Econometrica, 50, 1483–1504.
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